On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland as a state. The reactions of the international community have ranged between negative, cautious, neutral and silence. While Somaliland has welcomed Israel’s recognition, others have argued that its recognition is unwise, dangerous and illegal.
This contribution will explore the legal contours of state recognition and whether the recognition of Somaliland is a breach of international law. At the outset it should be said that I have advised the government of Somaliland on matters of recognition in the past, though this contribution is in my personal capacity.
Somaliland and Israeli recognition
The British protectorate of Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, it unified with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. Somalilanders were marginalized and discriminated against during unification and the two entities – comprised of distinct clans – never fully integrated. During the civil war that broke out in 1988, the forces of Somali President Siad Barre committed widespread atrocities against the Isaaq clan, the dominant clan in Somaliland. Thousands of civilians were killed (estimated at 50,000—60,000) and roughly a million people fled Somaliland. As calamity overtook Somalia, in contrast, by January 1991, the Somali National Movement (the SNM, which despite its name was an Isaaq-led organization based in Somaliland) consolidated its position in Somaliland, effectively controlling the territory (see Amnesty International, Mburu and Bradbury, pp. 32-49). On 18 May 1991, a national congress was convened in Somaliland, whereas Somaliland decided to resume its independence. Later on, the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland was adopted by the parliament on 30 April 2000 and approved by a referendum held on 31 May 2001, when 97% of the voters voted in its favor (the referendum was viewed by outside observers to be “conducted openly, fairly, honestly, and largely in accordance with internationally recognized election procedures”). The governments of Somaliland and Somalia have held talks in 2013 and in 2023, in an attempt to reconcile their differences, to no avail.
Since then, the Republic of Somaliland has existed de facto as an independent state, free of Somali or other foreign presence. It has a permanent population of roughly 6 million people and its permanent boundaries are that of the former British protectorate of Somaliland (notwithstanding a disputed boundary with Puntland in Somalia in the east). As opposed to Somalia, Somaliland is relatively stable and safe, has held several democratic elections with peaceful transitions of power, with a government that maintains public order, services and infrastructure (see Crawford, pp. 412-415; Lewis, pp. 30-72; Prunier; Bradbury, pp. 4-5, 184-219). While states have refrained from recognizing Somaliland until now, Somaliland nevertheless exercises foreign relations with a range of states and international organizations. Prominent examples are agreements with Ethiopia establishing a consulate in Hargeisa (which Somaliland claims has been upgraded to an embassy), the building of a Somaliland embassy in Addis Ababa, and the agreement with United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-owned port operator, DP World, to develop and manage the port in Berbera. In addition, the UAE and the European Union (EU) have provided training and support to Somaliland’s security forces. At the same time, the lack of recognition has barred assistance from organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, signed a declaration recognizing Somaliland and “its right of self-determination” on 26 December 2025, “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of President Trump”. He noted the close informal relations between the two parties and that Israel intends to cooperate with and assist Somaliland in the fields of agriculture, health, technology and economic and social development (see also here). Israel’s Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, paid an official visit to Somaliland in early January 2026. He stated that Israel “will determine for itself who it recognizes”.
Commentators note the strategic location of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. It can offer Israel access to the region, in particular as a potential base for operations against the Houthis across the Gulf in Yemen. The Houthis, for their part, have stated that any Israeli presence would be considered a target by them. Others suggest that Israel’s decision is part of a broader move related to regional competition, in collaboration with the UAE, another state with close ties to Somaliland, intended to counter increased Iranian and Turkish influence in the region, (see here, here, and here).
Reactions to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, welcomed Israel’s “historic and principled” decision as a “milestone in Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of international legitimacy, reaffirming its historical, legal, and moral entitlements to statehood”. He further conveyed Somaliland’s intention to join the Abraham Accords and “deepen cooperation across a broad range of sectors”. Mass celebrations have been reported in Somaliland following the recognition.
A 28 December 2025 statement by the foreign ministers of 22 Muslim, Arab and African states, organizations and entities rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as “a grave violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, which explicitly stipulates the imperative of protecting the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity”. They also warned that recognition threatens international peace and security. The statement further rejected “any potential link between such measure and any attempts to forcibly expel the Palestinian people out of their land” (see also here and here), referring to reports in the media of discussions between Israel, Somalia, Somaliland and the US on the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza—reports that Somalia and Somaliland have denied. Among states that did not join this statement are the UAE, Bahrain and Morrocco, all parties to the Abraham Accords.
Somaliland’s recognition follows a recent wave of recognitions of Palestine, including by several western states, a matter that was raised in a meeting of the Security Council on 29 December 2025. During the meeting, the US stated that Israel has the same right to conduct itself as other States that have recently decided to unilaterally recognize “a nonexistent Palestinian state”. It added that its own position on the statehood of Somaliland had not changed. Slovenia rejected this comparison, stating that it has recognized Palestine “in response” to the “undeniable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” and that “Palestine is not part of any state – it is illegally occupied territory as declared by the International Court of Justice”. Slovenia then asserted that recognizing Somaliland “goes against…Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter”. As will be explained below, the recognition of Somaliland is much more comparable to that of Kosovo, not Palestine.
Speaking in the Security Council, Somalia – also on behalf of Algeria, Guyana and Sierra Leone – described the recognition as “an act of aggression”. Somalia also asserted that the recognition was a violation of the United Nations Charter and “a breach of a cornerstone of international law: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States”. On 12 January 2025, Somalia announced that it was terminating agreements with the UAE in light of what it perceives as the latter’s involvement in facilitating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Türkiye has called the recognition “a clear violation of international law” and an “interference in Somalia’s internal affairs”.
Several states and organizations expressed their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need for dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland and the potential destabilizing effect of the recognition (China, Denmark, France, Slovenia, Somalia, Russia, UK, EU). Some states have taken the view that the recognition is a potential threat to regional peace and security that reinforces Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in the region (Somalia, Russia, UK). For the African Union (see also here) in particular, recognition of Somaliland raises the fear of encouraging secessionist movements across the continent and their subsequent recognition, counter to the principle agreed by its member states in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”, reflective of the wider principle of territorial integrity, discussed below. Israel was further condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Collaboration, and the Arab League.
Noticeable silence on the recent development has come from two powerful regional powers, Kenya and Ethiopia. The latter had agreed in a memorandum of understanding in July 2024 to recognize Somaliland in exchange for Somaliland’s agreement to establish an Ethiopian naval base in its territory.
The (non)legal dimensions of recognition
The recognition of Somaliland undoubtedly raises wide-ranging and significant issues, as well as concerns for both the well-being of the affected people and for the security and stability of the region. The legal arguments concerning the act of recognition, however, are much narrower. When a state is created on part of the territory of an existing state which continues to exist, it can be generally referred to as ‘secession’. As reflected above, the main legal arguments raised are that recognition of a secessionist entity as a state constitutes a use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (or aggression) against its parent state, breaches the obligation of non-intervention, or is a breach of its territorial integrity.
At the outset, a declaration of recognition does not involve use of force and therefore cannot be said to be in breach of Article 2(4) or an act of aggression. Territorial integrity is only mentioned in the Charter in the context of the use of force, and non-intervention under Article 2(7) only applies to the United Nations, not member states.
But a more difficult question is whether recognition can breach the wider principle of territorial integrity or the principle of non-intervention under customary international law, reflected in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970. As Pellet notes (p. 274), it is unquestionable that secession undermines the territorial integrity of the parent state, but that effect in itself does not dictate that secession by a non-state actor is illegal, and that recognizing a seceding entity is illegal, absent an international rule to that effect (ibid).
Under the constitutive theory of state recognition, an entity becomes a state by the act of recognition itself. Recognition then is purely a matter of states’ discretion (Talmon, p. 102; Crawford, pp. 4-5). The dominant theory of state recognition in the literature, however, is the declaratory theory, under which a state’s existence “is a question of fact” (Badinter Commission), independent of recognition. In the words of Crawford (p. 93), “an entity is not a state because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a state”. As such, Somalia is correct to assert that the recognition of Somaliland does not alter the latter’s status, but that does not mean that its recognition is a breach of international law.
Rather, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, though “there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession…this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, para. 155). International law is neutral when it comes to secession. It is neither legal nor illegal, but a legally neutral act that produces consequences for the international community (Crawford, p. 390). There is no principle of international law that forbids an entity to secede. While assisting a non-state actor in attempting to secede could arguably be a breach of the principle of non-intervention, when a seceding entity is able to meet the requirements of statehood on its own, and particularly demonstrate the requisite level of effectiveness and independence, it is thus established in fact. While examples in the United Nations era are rare, international law does not prohibit states from recognizing the seceding entity’s existence as a state (Crawford, pp. 390-391, 415-418 (also here, p. 282); Milanović, pp. 33-34; Pellet, pp. 274-276; Weller, p. 136; see also here, para. 401).
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is also a process-oriented approach to secession, according to which, as Milano explains, international law does not prohibit secession, but it “regulates the processes by which secession is produced” (pp. 195, 214). It does so, in practice, by assessing factors such as whether a secessionist ‘state’ is a result of an external military intervention, if it clearly manifests the will of its local population in favor of secession, whether it made reasonable efforts to reach a compromise solution with the existing state, and whether its establishment respects the principle of uti possidetis (pp. 195-201). Even under this ‘processual’ approach, it should be noted, an “irreversible status quo” of an entity demonstrating the required effectiveness of a state may ultimately be recognized by other states, as “territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders, even when framed in terms of uti possidetis, are not norms of a peremptory character and no secondary rule of general international law imposes on third states a duty not to recognise the new situation as lawful under international law” (pp. 209-210; see also International Law Commission (ILC), Draft articles on State Responsibility, Art. 41 with commentaries).
When may recognition be considered illegal?
While the decision to recognize thus operates in the political rather than the legal sphere, there are nevertheless three well-established scenarios in which recognition of a secessionist entity will be considered a breach of international law. The first is ‘premature recognition’. This occurs under the declaratory theory when a state recognizes an entity before it meets the requirements of statehood (see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, para. f; Thürer and Burri, para. 40). (Under the constitutive theory recognition cannot be premature, as recognition itself brings the state into being). This argument has been mentioned, for example, with respect to some of the early recognitions of Kosovo, as well as Croatia and Slovenia (Tomuschat; Oeter). In any event, in the case of recognizing Somaliland, which has functioned as a de facto state independent of Somalia for decades, premature recognition is unlikely to be at issue.
In addition, according to Crawford (p. 387), a right of self-determination may “legitimize recognition that would otherwise be premature”. If the doctrine of remedial secession – allowing the exercise of external self-determination – is part of customary international law, which is controversial (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, paras. 82-83; Milanović, p. 34), it can reasonably be said to apply to Somaliland, as the mass crimes committed by Somalia against Somaliland during the civil war – amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and likely exhibit the facts and special intent present in acts of genocide against the Isaaq clan – were gross violations of the fundamental human rights of Somalilanders and are a solid basis for the rise of a right to remedial secession (Poore; Carroll and Rajagopal, pp. 666-674; Mburu, pp. 36-42; Klich, p. 116; Keinard and Einashe; International Crisis Group, pp. 5-6).
Second, recognition may be illegal if an entity is constituted by “the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81; ILC, Art. 41; Crawford, p. 160; Milano, pp. 195-197). An often quoted example is the obligation not to recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established following Türkiye’s illegal use of force against Cyprus (Milano, p. 195; Vidmar, p. 382, fn. 147; Milanović, p. 33). This scenario is not applicable to Somaliland, which established and sustains its independence from Somalia without any foreign military intervention.
Third, and not unrelated to the previous scenarios, recognition is illegal where the Security Council has adopted a resolution obligating states not to recognize an entity as a state or part of another state. For example, in resolution 662 (1990), the Security Council decided that “that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void”. No such decision has been taken in the case of Somaliland.
But, as explained above, international law does not prohibit recognition of a seceding entity that meets the criteria for statehood in the absence of these three scenarios. Alternatively, Somaliland may be recognized under the ‘processual approach’, if one were to apply it: Somaliland was established within its administrative boundaries and those of the former British protectorate, thus conforming to the uti possidetis principle; its statehood reflects the overwhelming wishes of the local population as reflected in a free and fair referendum; it has attempted dialogue with Somalia; and it is an effective entity established without foreign military intervention. Thus, the recognition of Somaliland by any state is unlikely to be a breach of international law.
The example of Kosovo
Slovenia is correct to assert that the statehood of Palestine is in the context of a foreign occupation and therefore its recognition is inherently dissimilar to that of a secessionist entity such as Somaliland. While each case may be said to be different, the recognition of Somaliland is more comparable to that of Kosovo, and its declared independence from Serbia. But as a matter of law, as with Kosovo (and with Palestine, where differences of views exist as to whether it meets the criteria for statehood, compare Milanović with Verdirame), it is most likely that the US is correct that the recognition of Somaliland is within the political prerogative of a state.
In the Kosovo advisory proceedings, a small minority of States argued that the principle of territorial integrity applies to internal actors and, therefore, this principle and that of non-intervention bar other states from recognizing a seceding state (e.g., Cyprus, paras. 82-89; Serbia, paras. 423-424; Spain, paras. 2-5; see also Milanović, p. 43; Crawford, pp. 282-283). The Court, however, referring to the Friendly Relations Declaration, concluded that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”, and does not apply to non-state actors (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 80; for the opposite view see the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, paras. 19-26). Though the direct issue of recognition by states was not addressed by the Court, according to Crawford (p. 283), the Court effectively endorsed the view that states are within their right to recognize Kosovo or not (see also Pellet, p. 276; Weller, p. 135).
To date, 121 states have recognized Kosovo, including Israel, as well as states that have argued that recognizing Somaliland is illegal, such as Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, and Türkiye. It is worth mentioning that in the case of Somaliland there is no question of a link between a likely illegal foreign military intervention (the NATO military intervention of 1999) and independence, as opposed to Kosovo. In addition, at no point has Somaliland been in danger of collapsing, under threat of being consumed by its ‘parent’ state, or reliant on international actors to sustain its independence, as can be argued with respect to Kosovo (see Tomuschat, pp. 38-39; Tancredi, pp. 105-106). At no point has Somaliland been dependent on outside actors for its existence.
There does not seem to be any principled difference between the recognition of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia to that of Somaliland from Somalia.
Final thoughts
This recent development brings with it both opportunities and risks. For the people of Somaliland, this has been seen as a momentous occasion—the first of potential future recognitions, as it attempts to join the community of nations. For Somalia, the region, and more broadly, it presents an increased risk of further destabilization in an already volatile region. From a legal perspective, it further demonstrates the astuteness of Crawford’s observation that secession is a legally neutral act and its recognition is not governed by law, but “the consequences of which are regulated internationally”, and produce “important legal and political effects” (Crawford, pp. 27, 390).
The Legality of Recognizing Somaliland
Written by Eran SthoegerOn 26 December 2025, Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland as a state. The reactions of the international community have ranged between negative, cautious, neutral and silence. While Somaliland has welcomed Israel’s recognition, others have argued that its recognition is unwise, dangerous and illegal.
This contribution will explore the legal contours of state recognition and whether the recognition of Somaliland is a breach of international law. At the outset it should be said that I have advised the government of Somaliland on matters of recognition in the past, though this contribution is in my personal capacity.
Somaliland and Israeli recognition
The British protectorate of Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, it unified with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. Somalilanders were marginalized and discriminated against during unification and the two entities – comprised of distinct clans – never fully integrated. During the civil war that broke out in 1988, the forces of Somali President Siad Barre committed widespread atrocities against the Isaaq clan, the dominant clan in Somaliland. Thousands of civilians were killed (estimated at 50,000—60,000) and roughly a million people fled Somaliland. As calamity overtook Somalia, in contrast, by January 1991, the Somali National Movement (the SNM, which despite its name was an Isaaq-led organization based in Somaliland) consolidated its position in Somaliland, effectively controlling the territory (see Amnesty International, Mburu and Bradbury, pp. 32-49). On 18 May 1991, a national congress was convened in Somaliland, whereas Somaliland decided to resume its independence. Later on, the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland was adopted by the parliament on 30 April 2000 and approved by a referendum held on 31 May 2001, when 97% of the voters voted in its favor (the referendum was viewed by outside observers to be “conducted openly, fairly, honestly, and largely in accordance with internationally recognized election procedures”). The governments of Somaliland and Somalia have held talks in 2013 and in 2023, in an attempt to reconcile their differences, to no avail.
Since then, the Republic of Somaliland has existed de facto as an independent state, free of Somali or other foreign presence. It has a permanent population of roughly 6 million people and its permanent boundaries are that of the former British protectorate of Somaliland (notwithstanding a disputed boundary with Puntland in Somalia in the east). As opposed to Somalia, Somaliland is relatively stable and safe, has held several democratic elections with peaceful transitions of power, with a government that maintains public order, services and infrastructure (see Crawford, pp. 412-415; Lewis, pp. 30-72; Prunier; Bradbury, pp. 4-5, 184-219). While states have refrained from recognizing Somaliland until now, Somaliland nevertheless exercises foreign relations with a range of states and international organizations. Prominent examples are agreements with Ethiopia establishing a consulate in Hargeisa (which Somaliland claims has been upgraded to an embassy), the building of a Somaliland embassy in Addis Ababa, and the agreement with United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-owned port operator, DP World, to develop and manage the port in Berbera. In addition, the UAE and the European Union (EU) have provided training and support to Somaliland’s security forces. At the same time, the lack of recognition has barred assistance from organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, signed a declaration recognizing Somaliland and “its right of self-determination” on 26 December 2025, “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of President Trump”. He noted the close informal relations between the two parties and that Israel intends to cooperate with and assist Somaliland in the fields of agriculture, health, technology and economic and social development (see also here). Israel’s Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, paid an official visit to Somaliland in early January 2026. He stated that Israel “will determine for itself who it recognizes”.
Commentators note the strategic location of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. It can offer Israel access to the region, in particular as a potential base for operations against the Houthis across the Gulf in Yemen. The Houthis, for their part, have stated that any Israeli presence would be considered a target by them. Others suggest that Israel’s decision is part of a broader move related to regional competition, in collaboration with the UAE, another state with close ties to Somaliland, intended to counter increased Iranian and Turkish influence in the region, (see here, here, and here).
Reactions to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, welcomed Israel’s “historic and principled” decision as a “milestone in Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of international legitimacy, reaffirming its historical, legal, and moral entitlements to statehood”. He further conveyed Somaliland’s intention to join the Abraham Accords and “deepen cooperation across a broad range of sectors”. Mass celebrations have been reported in Somaliland following the recognition.
A 28 December 2025 statement by the foreign ministers of 22 Muslim, Arab and African states, organizations and entities rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as “a grave violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, which explicitly stipulates the imperative of protecting the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity”. They also warned that recognition threatens international peace and security. The statement further rejected “any potential link between such measure and any attempts to forcibly expel the Palestinian people out of their land” (see also here and here), referring to reports in the media of discussions between Israel, Somalia, Somaliland and the US on the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza—reports that Somalia and Somaliland have denied. Among states that did not join this statement are the UAE, Bahrain and Morrocco, all parties to the Abraham Accords.
Somaliland’s recognition follows a recent wave of recognitions of Palestine, including by several western states, a matter that was raised in a meeting of the Security Council on 29 December 2025. During the meeting, the US stated that Israel has the same right to conduct itself as other States that have recently decided to unilaterally recognize “a nonexistent Palestinian state”. It added that its own position on the statehood of Somaliland had not changed. Slovenia rejected this comparison, stating that it has recognized Palestine “in response” to the “undeniable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” and that “Palestine is not part of any state – it is illegally occupied territory as declared by the International Court of Justice”. Slovenia then asserted that recognizing Somaliland “goes against…Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter”. As will be explained below, the recognition of Somaliland is much more comparable to that of Kosovo, not Palestine.
Speaking in the Security Council, Somalia – also on behalf of Algeria, Guyana and Sierra Leone – described the recognition as “an act of aggression”. Somalia also asserted that the recognition was a violation of the United Nations Charter and “a breach of a cornerstone of international law: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States”. On 12 January 2025, Somalia announced that it was terminating agreements with the UAE in light of what it perceives as the latter’s involvement in facilitating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Türkiye has called the recognition “a clear violation of international law” and an “interference in Somalia’s internal affairs”.
Several states and organizations expressed their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need for dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland and the potential destabilizing effect of the recognition (China, Denmark, France, Slovenia, Somalia, Russia, UK, EU). Some states have taken the view that the recognition is a potential threat to regional peace and security that reinforces Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in the region (Somalia, Russia, UK). For the African Union (see also here) in particular, recognition of Somaliland raises the fear of encouraging secessionist movements across the continent and their subsequent recognition, counter to the principle agreed by its member states in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”, reflective of the wider principle of territorial integrity, discussed below. Israel was further condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Collaboration, and the Arab League.
Noticeable silence on the recent development has come from two powerful regional powers, Kenya and Ethiopia. The latter had agreed in a memorandum of understanding in July 2024 to recognize Somaliland in exchange for Somaliland’s agreement to establish an Ethiopian naval base in its territory.
The (non)legal dimensions of recognition
The recognition of Somaliland undoubtedly raises wide-ranging and significant issues, as well as concerns for both the well-being of the affected people and for the security and stability of the region. The legal arguments concerning the act of recognition, however, are much narrower. When a state is created on part of the territory of an existing state which continues to exist, it can be generally referred to as ‘secession’. As reflected above, the main legal arguments raised are that recognition of a secessionist entity as a state constitutes a use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (or aggression) against its parent state, breaches the obligation of non-intervention, or is a breach of its territorial integrity.
At the outset, a declaration of recognition does not involve use of force and therefore cannot be said to be in breach of Article 2(4) or an act of aggression. Territorial integrity is only mentioned in the Charter in the context of the use of force, and non-intervention under Article 2(7) only applies to the United Nations, not member states.
But a more difficult question is whether recognition can breach the wider principle of territorial integrity or the principle of non-intervention under customary international law, reflected in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970. As Pellet notes (p. 274), it is unquestionable that secession undermines the territorial integrity of the parent state, but that effect in itself does not dictate that secession by a non-state actor is illegal, and that recognizing a seceding entity is illegal, absent an international rule to that effect (ibid).
Under the constitutive theory of state recognition, an entity becomes a state by the act of recognition itself. Recognition then is purely a matter of states’ discretion (Talmon, p. 102; Crawford, pp. 4-5). The dominant theory of state recognition in the literature, however, is the declaratory theory, under which a state’s existence “is a question of fact” (Badinter Commission), independent of recognition. In the words of Crawford (p. 93), “an entity is not a state because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a state”. As such, Somalia is correct to assert that the recognition of Somaliland does not alter the latter’s status, but that does not mean that its recognition is a breach of international law.
Rather, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, though “there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession…this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, para. 155). International law is neutral when it comes to secession. It is neither legal nor illegal, but a legally neutral act that produces consequences for the international community (Crawford, p. 390). There is no principle of international law that forbids an entity to secede. While assisting a non-state actor in attempting to secede could arguably be a breach of the principle of non-intervention, when a seceding entity is able to meet the requirements of statehood on its own, and particularly demonstrate the requisite level of effectiveness and independence, it is thus established in fact. While examples in the United Nations era are rare, international law does not prohibit states from recognizing the seceding entity’s existence as a state (Crawford, pp. 390-391, 415-418 (also here, p. 282); Milanović, pp. 33-34; Pellet, pp. 274-276; Weller, p. 136; see also here, para. 401).
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is also a process-oriented approach to secession, according to which, as Milano explains, international law does not prohibit secession, but it “regulates the processes by which secession is produced” (pp. 195, 214). It does so, in practice, by assessing factors such as whether a secessionist ‘state’ is a result of an external military intervention, if it clearly manifests the will of its local population in favor of secession, whether it made reasonable efforts to reach a compromise solution with the existing state, and whether its establishment respects the principle of uti possidetis (pp. 195-201). Even under this ‘processual’ approach, it should be noted, an “irreversible status quo” of an entity demonstrating the required effectiveness of a state may ultimately be recognized by other states, as “territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders, even when framed in terms of uti possidetis, are not norms of a peremptory character and no secondary rule of general international law imposes on third states a duty not to recognise the new situation as lawful under international law” (pp. 209-210; see also International Law Commission (ILC), Draft articles on State Responsibility, Art. 41 with commentaries).
When may recognition be considered illegal?
While the decision to recognize thus operates in the political rather than the legal sphere, there are nevertheless three well-established scenarios in which recognition of a secessionist entity will be considered a breach of international law. The first is ‘premature recognition’. This occurs under the declaratory theory when a state recognizes an entity before it meets the requirements of statehood (see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, para. f; Thürer and Burri, para. 40). (Under the constitutive theory recognition cannot be premature, as recognition itself brings the state into being). This argument has been mentioned, for example, with respect to some of the early recognitions of Kosovo, as well as Croatia and Slovenia (Tomuschat; Oeter). In any event, in the case of recognizing Somaliland, which has functioned as a de facto state independent of Somalia for decades, premature recognition is unlikely to be at issue.
In addition, according to Crawford (p. 387), a right of self-determination may “legitimize recognition that would otherwise be premature”. If the doctrine of remedial secession – allowing the exercise of external self-determination – is part of customary international law, which is controversial (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, paras. 82-83; Milanović, p. 34), it can reasonably be said to apply to Somaliland, as the mass crimes committed by Somalia against Somaliland during the civil war – amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and likely exhibit the facts and special intent present in acts of genocide against the Isaaq clan – were gross violations of the fundamental human rights of Somalilanders and are a solid basis for the rise of a right to remedial secession (Poore; Carroll and Rajagopal, pp. 666-674; Mburu, pp. 36-42; Klich, p. 116; Keinard and Einashe; International Crisis Group, pp. 5-6).
Second, recognition may be illegal if an entity is constituted by “the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81; ILC, Art. 41; Crawford, p. 160; Milano, pp. 195-197). An often quoted example is the obligation not to recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established following Türkiye’s illegal use of force against Cyprus (Milano, p. 195; Vidmar, p. 382, fn. 147; Milanović, p. 33). This scenario is not applicable to Somaliland, which established and sustains its independence from Somalia without any foreign military intervention.
Third, and not unrelated to the previous scenarios, recognition is illegal where the Security Council has adopted a resolution obligating states not to recognize an entity as a state or part of another state. For example, in resolution 662 (1990), the Security Council decided that “that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void”. No such decision has been taken in the case of Somaliland.
But, as explained above, international law does not prohibit recognition of a seceding entity that meets the criteria for statehood in the absence of these three scenarios. Alternatively, Somaliland may be recognized under the ‘processual approach’, if one were to apply it: Somaliland was established within its administrative boundaries and those of the former British protectorate, thus conforming to the uti possidetis principle; its statehood reflects the overwhelming wishes of the local population as reflected in a free and fair referendum; it has attempted dialogue with Somalia; and it is an effective entity established without foreign military intervention. Thus, the recognition of Somaliland by any state is unlikely to be a breach of international law.
The example of Kosovo
Slovenia is correct to assert that the statehood of Palestine is in the context of a foreign occupation and therefore its recognition is inherently dissimilar to that of a secessionist entity such as Somaliland. While each case may be said to be different, the recognition of Somaliland is more comparable to that of Kosovo, and its declared independence from Serbia. But as a matter of law, as with Kosovo (and with Palestine, where differences of views exist as to whether it meets the criteria for statehood, compare Milanović with Verdirame), it is most likely that the US is correct that the recognition of Somaliland is within the political prerogative of a state.
In the Kosovo advisory proceedings, a small minority of States argued that the principle of territorial integrity applies to internal actors and, therefore, this principle and that of non-intervention bar other states from recognizing a seceding state (e.g., Cyprus, paras. 82-89; Serbia, paras. 423-424; Spain, paras. 2-5; see also Milanović, p. 43; Crawford, pp. 282-283). The Court, however, referring to the Friendly Relations Declaration, concluded that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”, and does not apply to non-state actors (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 80; for the opposite view see the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, paras. 19-26). Though the direct issue of recognition by states was not addressed by the Court, according to Crawford (p. 283), the Court effectively endorsed the view that states are within their right to recognize Kosovo or not (see also Pellet, p. 276; Weller, p. 135).
To date, 121 states have recognized Kosovo, including Israel, as well as states that have argued that recognizing Somaliland is illegal, such as Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, and Türkiye. It is worth mentioning that in the case of Somaliland there is no question of a link between a likely illegal foreign military intervention (the NATO military intervention of 1999) and independence, as opposed to Kosovo. In addition, at no point has Somaliland been in danger of collapsing, under threat of being consumed by its ‘parent’ state, or reliant on international actors to sustain its independence, as can be argued with respect to Kosovo (see Tomuschat, pp. 38-39; Tancredi, pp. 105-106). At no point has Somaliland been dependent on outside actors for its existence.
There does not seem to be any principled difference between the recognition of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia to that of Somaliland from Somalia.
Final thoughts
This recent development brings with it both opportunities and risks. For the people of Somaliland, this has been seen as a momentous occasion—the first of potential future recognitions, as it attempts to join the community of nations. For Somalia, the region, and more broadly, it presents an increased risk of further destabilization in an already volatile region. From a legal perspective, it further demonstrates the astuteness of Crawford’s observation that secession is a legally neutral act and its recognition is not governed by law, but “the consequences of which are regulated internationally”, and produce “important legal and political effects” (Crawford, pp. 27, 390).