The Significance of the Somaliland President’s Visit to Israel
The visit of President Abdillahi (“Irro”) of Somaliland to Israel can be understood as part of Israel’s effort to strengthen its strategic foothold around the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The two sides agreed to expand diplomatic and security cooperation, although the practical implementation of these commitments remains a future challenge. While neighboring Muslim-majority countries have intensified their vigilance, the situation is likely to remain one of competition for influence rather than direct confrontation. As such, the visit has become a symbolic event reflecting the ongoing reconfiguration of the regional order in the Middle East and Eastern Africa.
The Somaliland President’s Visit to Israel
As reports have begun to emerge regarding the contents of a possible agreement aimed at ending the war between Iran and the United States, international attention has increasingly focused on the issue. At the same time, one of the major news stories attracting interest across the broader region encompassing both the Middle East and Eastern Africa was the visit to Israel by President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (commonly known as “Irro”) of the “Republic of Somaliland,” which Israel became the first country in the world to recognize as a sovereign state in December of last year.
Israel invested considerable effort in drawing the United States into war with Iran and continued to take actions that impeded ceasefire negotiations. The conclusion of an agreement between the United States and Iran would therefore create circumstances unfavorable to Israel. Nevertheless, the warm reception accorded by the Israeli government to President Abdirahman during his visit from June 14 to 17 conveyed the impression that Israel continues to lay the groundwork for expanding its ambitious military-strategic initiatives.
This article seeks to provide a preliminary assessment of the implications of these developments.
The Legal Status of the Republic of Somaliland
Before proceeding, it is useful to briefly explain what the “Republic of Somaliland” is.
Somaliland is often described as an “unrecognized state.” However, since Israel has now formally recognized it, Somaliland can no longer be regarded as entirely unrecognized. Nevertheless, no other country has followed Israel’s example. In that sense, the fundamental nature of Somaliland’s international isolation remains unchanged.
Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has maintained de facto independence. At the time, however, Somalia as a whole was engulfed in civil war and clan-based conflict. As a result, there has long been strong international concern that recognizing Somaliland could encourage the further fragmentation of Somalia.
Historically, while most of present-day Somalia was under Italian administration, Somaliland was a British colony. Consequently, when decolonization accelerated in 1960, British Somaliland declared independence. It existed as an internationally recognized sovereign state for five days—from June 26, 1960, until its union with the former Italian-administered Trust Territory of Somalia on July 1, 1960. During that brief period, Somaliland received recognition from 35 countries, including the United States.
Under international law, the four criteria for statehood set out in the Montevideo Convention—population, territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states—are often used as a reference point. Somaliland clearly satisfies the first three requirements, but because recognition by other states remains limited, it can be argued that it still lacks the fourth.
At the same time, Somaliland enjoys friendly relations with neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya and maintains de facto diplomatic ties with them. It also has particularly close relations with Taiwan. The two sides have established representative offices equivalent to embassies and have developed not only economic and trade relations but also diplomatic exchanges.
Israel’s Strategic Calculations
Israel’s motivation for recognizing Somaliland is relatively clear.
Somaliland faces the Gulf of Aden and lies adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Located at the base of the Horn of Africa opposite the Arabian Peninsula, it occupies a geographical position similar to that of Djibouti, serving as a potential gateway for maritime trade between the Middle East and the countries of Eastern Africa. Moreover, because of its proximity to one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, Somaliland holds significant strategic value from a security perspective.
When Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen was conducting active military operations to expand its territorial control across the Gulf of Aden. The UAE’s DP World already possesses extensive management rights over the Port of Berbera in Somaliland. As one of the leading Arab supporters of the Abraham Accords, the UAE maintains close relations with Israel.
It was therefore evident that Israel’s move was intended to enhance its influence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden and increase pressure on the Houthis, whose headquarters are in Sana’a in northern Yemen.
Subsequently, however, Saudi Arabia launched a strong counteroffensive in January, compelling the UAE to withdraw from Yemen and significantly reducing the territory controlled by the STC.
At the same time, Iran experienced widespread domestic unrest characterized by growing protests and government repression. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched attacks against Iran, leading to a state of war. In response, Yemen’s Houthi movement hinted that it might coordinate with Iran—whose actions had restricted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—to obstruct navigation in the Red Sea.
Had both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait approached effective closure, the consequences for the global economy would have been severe.
In practice, however, the Houthis refrained from major action, while the United States and Israel also avoided large-scale preemptive operations against them. As a result, an atmosphere of uneasy tension prevailed around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Against this backdrop, it remained unclear how relations between Somaliland and Israel would evolve while Israel and Iran were actively at war.
Following the temporary ceasefire reached in early April, however, Israel intensified pressure in other theaters, including increased operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Consistent with this trend, an incident occurred in May in which Israel established an “embassy” in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, while Somaliland opened a corresponding mission in Jerusalem. Nineteen Muslim-majority countries issued a joint statement condemning the move. The signatories included most Arab states, as well as Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Sudan, Djibouti, the Federal Government of Somalia, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Notably, however, the UAE and Bahrain did not join the statement. Neither did Iran, Iraq, or Syria.
The Nature of the Containment Effort Against Somaliland
The countries expressing concern over growing Somaliland–Israel ties can generally be described as states that oppose Israeli policies while simultaneously maintaining some distance from the Iran-centered Shi’a bloc.
Although Yemen was among the signatories, it was represented by the Saudi-backed government rather than the Houthi movement. Likewise, Lebanon’s participation did not imply endorsement by Hezbollah. These governments appear eager to avoid allowing criticism of Israel and Somaliland to be interpreted as support for Iran.
In other words, condemning Israel and Somaliland does not necessarily mean aligning with Tehran.
At the same time, since these countries clearly view Israel with suspicion, it may be useful to think of the regional balance as increasingly divided among three broad camps.
Meanwhile, non-Muslim Eastern African states such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan have generally maintained relatively positive relations with Israel. Israel is often regarded as an important partner in areas such as counterterrorism cooperation against Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia in particular, which maintains exceptionally close ties with the UAE, has at times been accused of quietly supporting the RSF in Sudan’s civil war.
Conversely, Turkey and Egypt maintain close relations with Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu. Thus, the Somaliland issue has contributed to a gradual geopolitical polarization within Africa itself.
When this African dynamic is viewed together with the complex alignments of the Middle East, a triangular balance of power emerges: the Israel–Somaliland camp, the anti-Israel but non-Iranian Muslim-majority states, and the Iran-centered bloc.
China occupies a unique position. While maintaining close relations with Iran, it also enjoys strong ties with many other Muslim-majority countries. Given the potential implications for the Taiwan issue, Beijing is particularly wary of growing cooperation between Israel and Somaliland.
The United States, meanwhile, has seen influential conservative figures such as Senator Ted Cruz repeatedly argue that Somaliland holds strategic importance for American interests. Washington appears broadly sympathetic toward Somaliland, reflecting both support for Israel and the historical relationship between Somaliland and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, President Donald Trump has continued to avoid deep involvement.
The United States also maintains a military base in Djibouti, a neighboring state that remains wary of Somaliland. Because of political sensitivities surrounding President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, Washington faces constraints in using its Djibouti facilities for operations directed against Iran or the Houthis. Yet abandoning Djibouti in favor of Somaliland would entail considerable risks and costs, making such a shift unlikely.
The Results of President Abdillahi’s Visit
During his four-day visit, President Abdillahi met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials. Members of his accompanying military delegation reportedly also held discussions with the Israeli military.
The agreements reached appear to encompass not only civilian initiatives, such as establishing direct flights between Tel Aviv and Hargeisa, but also the expansion of security cooperation. However, the specific form that such cooperation will take remains unclear.
For Israel, the principal achievement lies in securing a strategic foothold on the Horn of Africa facing the Gulf of Aden. Whether this will ultimately translate into concrete military operations remains uncertain and will depend heavily on future developments. More likely, Israel will seek to establish intelligence and monitoring infrastructure in Somaliland as a foundation for long-term strategic engagement.
Neighboring countries will undoubtedly continue to protest and monitor these developments closely. Yet there is little indication that they intend to take direct punitive action against Somaliland. Instead, the more likely scenario is one of competitive positioning. Turkey, for example, is reportedly planning a new military facility along the coast of Puntland, the semi-autonomous region neighboring Somaliland. The future is therefore likely to be characterized not by open confrontation but by the gradual accumulation of strategic footholds and countermeasures by competing regional actors.
H. Shinoda
