This week saw Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki head to Cairo for yet another official visit, marking at least his seventh trip to the Egyptian capital since 2018.
This time, his visit follows a maritime cooperation agreement signed between Egypt and Eritrea, and a host of pertinent geopolitical developments in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia; not to mention the ongoing crisis in the Gulf.
In the maritime agreement signed last month, Cairo and Asmara declared that the security of the Red Sea is solely the responsibility of littoral states. The two have repeatedly stated the same following the signing of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024.
After signing the agreement in Asmara a few weeks ago, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty emphasized that “the governance and security of the Red Sea are tied directly to the national security of bordering nations.” He underlined Cairo’s support for Eritrea’s vision on Red Sea management, and described developments in Sudan, Somalia, and the region as a direct extension of Egyptian national security.
While Ethiopian officials have since expressed concern that Egypt is using this deal with Eritrea as a way to obstruct Ethiopia’s efforts to gain access to the Red Sea, its implementation was reportedly at the top of the agenda during Isaias’ visit to Egypt this week.
Meanwhile, Somalia, one-third of an axis formed by Cairo and Asmara in the wake of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, has been caught up in an internal crisis following a decision to extend presidential and parliamentary terms.
The move has sparked protests and violence in Mogadishu, with analysts observing the situation leaves Somalia on the periphery of developments tied to Red Sea security despite the significant build-up of Egyptian and Turkish military presence in the country over the past couple of years.
In Somaliland, which gained recognition from Israel, another key regional player, a few months ago, the new administration of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) is opting to keep the MoU with Ethiopia under wraps.
In the meantime, the Ethiopian government continues to depict sea access as crucial for a nation with a population of over 120 million people whose territory comes within 60 kilometers of the Red Sea coast. Further, scholars, researchers and Ethiopian officials point to historical, legal, and geographical venues Ethiopia can explore to secure maritime access, particularly in light of how the country lost the port of Assab three decades ago.
Globally, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides legal frameworks for sea access rights. The African Union’s (AU) ‘Blue Economy’ also aligns with UNCLOS. The ‘2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) is the AU’s primary framework to reclaim Africa’s maritime domain. It targets illegal fishing, environmental dumping, and transit safety.
International laws and codes feature provisions that allow landlocked countries to secure sea access.
Further, AU’s AIM Strategy proposes a common African maritime space without internal administrative barriers. The objective is to boost intra-African trade, streamline maritime transport, and establish shared monitoring systems against transnational threats.
Nonetheless, Costantinos Berhutesfa (PhD), former AU anti-graft commissioner and geopolitical and public policy commentator, highlights how access to the Red Sea has been politicized in a manner that ignores or dismisses global maritime laws.
“Egypt is saying non-littoral countries like Ethiopia should not come near the Red Sea. The Arab world and Eritrea are backing Egypt’s position. Ethiopia has the right to access the sea. Ethiopia can also own ports through agreements. The MoU with Somaliland is a triggering point for all of this spiraling dynamism. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud [Somali president] spoiled the MoU but as of now, HSM is in turmoil domestically. Djibouti is too small and insufficient for Ethiopia’s huge import needs,” says Costantinos.
Experts underline that Egypt’s extensive efforts to assert power in the Horn of Africa disregard international maritime laws. They also underline that the reason global powers are scrambling for a foothold on the Red Sea coast while nearby countries like Ethiopia are denied access, is because regional and continental organizations like AU and IGAD lack the institutional infrastructure and definitive authority to secure the continent’s maritime spaces collectively.
Tsimdo
Tsimdo is a name commonly used to refer to the military alliance forged between TPLF and Eritrean forces. Despite the grave human rights violations committed by Eritrean forces in Tigray during the two-year war, the two have established an alliance, according to statements issued by the federal government.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused Eritrea and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of backing armed groups and insurgents in Ethiopia.
Last week, drone strikes reportedly targeted military convoys allegedly crossing from northwestern Tigray into Eritrea, and from there into Sudan. TPLF-aligned military forces are reportedly actively supporting the SAF’s war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, which has dragged on for more than three years now.
Last week, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), accused Tsimdo of being behind a decades-long assault on Ethiopian sovereignty and unity.
“Tsimdo is not new. Since the 1960s, Ethiopia’s enemies have been forging the same force against Ethiopia. The current Tsimdo is the same force that has been backed by the foreign enemies of Ethiopia in the past,” said the Field Marshal.
Last month, TPLF, despite being proscribed by the federal government for its role in the two-year war, reinstated the pre-war administration in Tigray by replacing the federally-mandated Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) and its president, Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede.
The move has stoked fears once again that the federal government and forces loyal to the TPLF might be heading towards another conflict.
“Since the beginning of history, Egypt has tried to stop Ethiopia from using the Nile River, including direct attacks even while Egypt was under Ottoman rule. But now, Egypt is focused on destabilizing Ethiopia by investing in all types of armed forces and divisive strategies in Ethiopia’s domestic politics. Eritrea cannot afford direct war with Ethiopia as of now, so it is running Egypt’s agenda of creating asymmetric conflicts across Ethiopia,” says Costantinos.
He notes the protracted conflict in many parts of the country are affecting Ethiopia’s prospects for economic growth and investment, and warns they could lead to an unconstitutional change of government if allowed to continue.
“The Ethiopian government needs to reach peaceful political settlements with the armed forces, be it TPLF, Fano, OLF-Shane, or others,” recommends Costantinos. “Regarding Egypt, Eritrea and other external concerns, the US has the leverage to mediate.However, the US has only permanent interest, not permanent friends. But now, since Iran is testing US presence in the Gulf, Washington is considering a shift towards the Red Sea. The US might even consider a military base on the Eritrean coast. It might also proceed to ensure Ethiopia’s stability. But true stability will only come if the US moves to keep Egypt out of the Horn and facilitate Ethiopia’s right to develop and use ports on the Red Sea.”
He observes Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos’ recent visit to the US could augur well for Ethiopia’s port pursuit.
Source The Reporter
